

# THE AIM OF THE ANALYTIC ACT

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What is promised as an end of analysis?<sup>1</sup> This question has been present from the beginning of psychoanalysis. Is it to cure what Freud called the "illness" of neurosis, that is, to reduce the dissidence of the symptom and reestablish "normality"—and, in particular, sexual "normality"? Freud was not far from this idea when he claimed that the capacity to love and work were the best we could hope to obtain, as well as when he ironically explained that the goal was to transform neurotic misfortune into common misfortune. Lacan, on the contrary, when interrogating the end of analysis in 1968, claimed that the aim was to produce an incurable subject. But in 1975, in contrast, he linked the end of analysis with identification with the symptom. It is this apparent change of perspective that I will investigate.

## THE ILLNESS OF MANKIND

Psychoanalysis, via Freud and Lacan, has produced the formula for the sexual illness of mankind. Due to the unconscious, "there is no such thing as a sexual relationship." With this thesis, the status of the symptom is altered, and consequently the status of the therapeutic act. Let me follow this thread.

The thesis that the unconscious is structured like a language, and the symptom as a message, or metaphor, was suggested by Freudian technique. But as Lacan never ceased to re-elaborate in his later years, with the unconscious understood as the "treasure of the drive"—which implies a wedding of the signifier and the living being—the symptom is the response of *jouissance*. Thus, Lacan came to the point where he recaptured the fundamental Freudian thesis: the symptom is a mode of satisfaction. It can be deciphered like a message, but it is not only a way of speaking, but above all it is a way of enjoying. This is why, years ago, I did not hesitate to evoke Lacan's second step as a "second return to Freud."<sup>2</sup> The language of the symptom is, so to speak, incarnated, embodied; it organizes and regulates *jouissance*. Even further, the unconscious is made real through *jouissance*. Hence the surprising formula from *Encore*: "The real, I will say, is the mystery of the speaking body, the mystery of the unconscious."<sup>3</sup>

In psychoanalysis, however, therapeutic effects testify to the grasp of language on what is most real in symptomatic disorders; one verifies that the least verbal of symptoms (anxiety, somatization, thought disturbances) can be transformed by the sole means of language. The curious docility of the symptom in an analytic session supports this conception of the unconscious.

Freud thus confronted the following problem: how can a mode of *jouissance* that is so self-centered, even autistic, come to be reconciled with the relationship of desire and love for another body, which is obviously necessary for the constitution of the sexual couple, whatever it may be, but especially of the heterosexual couple? The discovery of the drive, far from leading to pansexualism, rather posed the question, from its very origin, of the libido that was apt to sustain the sexual link. If Freud opened this perspective, he did not carry it to its logical conclusion. To answer the question, finally, he has nothing to offer but his elaboration of the Oedipus complex, with the various identifications that it entails. With this, he tried to explain one thing and its reverse, I mean the norm of heterosexual desire and what differs from it. And when he admitted that he did not know, it was the concept of “constitution”—that is, nature—so often referred to by him, that remained his last resort. I certainly realize that Freud’s texts are always more subtle than the mere enunciation of his theses and that the number of nuances with which he corrects each of them defies any easy summary. Nonetheless, after having clearly located the link between the symptom and sex—and it is precisely on this point that he broke decisively with Jung—Freud turned the symptom into an anomaly of the sexual, more precisely a distorted substitute of the so-called normal sexual satisfaction. Hence, in this case, it was obvious that the symptom could only be conceived within the sphere of an individual pathology of *jouissance*.

It must be said that this point of view is strongly suggested by the most elementary clinical experience of hearing the subject’s complaint. A symptom is presented to the analyst as that which does not stop imposing itself. Whether it is in the form of not being able to refrain from certain thoughts or from a feeling in the body, or from experiencing certain troubling affects, a symptom is experienced as a disturbance, an anomaly, a deviation or constraint. In this respect, the only difference between the patient and Freud is that the former does not immediately perceive the symptom’s sexual implications, although from the very beginning, transference makes him aware of the incidence of the unconscious.

The primary affect of the symptom as dysfunction is a fact no clinician could deny, Lacan no more than any other. But, what does psychoanalysis reveal when it deals with the “psychology of the love life,” in both its happy and unhappy forms, if not this: the unconscious is captain of the ship, presiding over what we call the mysteries of love, specifically over the choice of object insofar as it causes desire and/or *jouissance*. To put it in another way, the love partner, in the sexual sense of the term, and more generally any partner inscribed in a social link, is no less a product of the unconscious, no less coded than an obsession or a somatization. Thus between a man and a woman, and more generally between any two bodies, the unconscious is present,

simultaneously separating and linking them. Freud perceived this when he exposed the fact that both love life and groups formations are produced by repetitive choices. Repetition means that it is not all women that interest a man, but only some, that is, those who are linked with his unconscious. In other words, there is no such a thing as sexual “instinct.”

### THERE IS THE SYMPTOM

The general formula could be stated as follows: if there is no such thing as a sexual relationship, there is the symptom. The symptom is a substitute built from the unconscious.

Between these two formulas a third one remains implicit, a concept at which Lacan hammered away for a whole seminar through the famous phrase “There is (the) One.” This formula is not as simple as it seems, whether it refers to the “One” of the signifier One as opposed to Two, or the “One” of the saying, the One-saying (*l’Un-dire*), or the “One” of the jouissance of the body beyond all ties. In each case, this formula underscores the exile of the speaking-being (*parlêtre*) from any relation with the jouissance of the sexual partner. The symptom that achieves a union between the discreet elements of the unconscious and that other thing which is jouissance, as I have said, provides a replacement. Given that an appropriate or natural partner for jouissance is lacking, the symptom is put in place of something else, a substitute, an element seized from the unconscious, or a letter (as Lacan claimed in 1975), which fixes the privileged jouissance of the subject, this subject, who is subjected otherwise to the great law of the want-to-be. Lacan went so far to say: the symptom is the way by which everyone “enjoys the unconscious” (*jouit de son inconscient*).<sup>4</sup>

I designate the *fundamental symptom*, just as we speak of the fundamental fantasy, as the singular symptom which establishes a link where there is no established social link, that is to say, at the level of love affairs. As Lacan says in *Television*, love affairs are cut from any social link. This means, in the same way that the psychotic subject confronts his organs and even his life without the assistance of a discourse, every speaking being is forced to confront the other sexed body without the help of an established discourse. The fundamental symptom is the symptom which compensates for this fundamental lack, it determines a singular mode of relating to a sexual partner, a modality that is always enigmatic, produced by the unconscious as operating on the real. At this level, every one is without equal (*sans pareil*), and this is why Lacan can say that, for a man, “a woman is a symptom.” I have called this the “fundamental symptom,” but could also call it the last symptom, for it is the symptom that compensates for the lack of the final term in the field of libido language.

The fundamental symptom is no longer the problem but the solution—and this is without any paradox. The solution is proper to everyone, the response to the non rapport imposed on all, the universal illness for beings who are affected by the unconscious. “There is no such a thing

as sexual relationship” means that any partner is a symptomatic one. This symptomatic solution can be more or less uncomfortable for the subject, more or less common, but in any case it responds to the lack which is at the core of language, the lack stemming from the impossibility of inscribing the other *jouissance*.

A solution is invented, case by case, according to the accidents of history. But what can be said of the inventor? It is difficult to say that the symptom is the subject’s invention, since it constrains him. Shall we say that it is an invention of the unconscious? This would be too simple, for it would also be necessary to bring up the response of *jouissance*—the subject of *jouissance*—which creates what Freud called a “fixation.” Let us say then that this marriage of the unconscious element and *jouissance* is the fruit of the conjuncture of first encounters—which, as Freud would say, are traumatic. According to him, these encounters have either touched one’s own body or the other’s body. Therefore, the unconscious in the symptom-letter is not the discourse of the Other, it is the trace of the contingency of a fateful encounter (*rencontre fatale*)—just as we say *femme fatale*—with a being of *jouissance* that the subject did not know, but which had already begun to respond.

I therefore conclude that invention was at the beginning. Invention is found not only in the act that is reiterated as always new, without Other—and this is why I have elsewhere spoken of “actheism” to play on “atheism”—and also not only in the ciphering that makes unexpected statements appear. In the beginning there is no subject, for the subject is an effect. There is, however, the symptom, which is the choice of a singular *jouissance*, in the double sense of the term (as individual and strange). The speaking being must recognize itself in the very opacity of this *jouissance*. This, indeed, is why inventions, especially those in the arts, can be homologous to the symptom. We can also conceive, if the symptom is invented in the gap of the Other, that a new symptomatic invention can expel another. Therefore, the first encounter, which I called fateful, is not fatal.

The spectrum of consequences that the symptom entails is vast, but the foremost one is this: there is no subject without a symptom. It is through the symptom that everyone has access to his or her *jouissance*. Its functions as a prosthetic device, given the foreclosure of sex. In other words, every subject invents or adopts—if the term invents is too strong—an alternative, something which comes into the place of the empty rapport. One should never dream of eliminating it, and with it we can defend the incurable Lacan spoke of in 1968. An analysis which starts with the symptom will also end with the symptom, but with an obvious transformation. A key question now emerges: how does the act operate on this necessary function of the symptom, and how can we situate the therapeutic effect?

## SYMPTOM(S)

If the symptom is a substitution, not all substitutions have equal value. The problem is then to define the value in question. Given that the ethic of psychoanalysis is not an ethic of norms, what would provide the criterion of values? *Jouissance*? This is problematic, given that *jouissance* is subject to several paradoxes. We would have to ask the question, “*Jouissance* for whom?” since the value of *jouissance* for the speaking being is linked to its exchange value. The Other cannot be eliminated here. On a practical level, this means that autism is not a tenable position. There are certainly instances of autistic *jouissance*, but they are strictly local: Freud noticed this early on, amazed at how one can fall ill from not being able to love, in other words, from not being able to transfer one’s libido outside oneself. More than that, we know that it is not any *jouissance* whatsoever that is compatible with the social link.

There are clearly many different types of symptoms. On the one hand, the Other of discourse proposes a symptom to the subject. The symptom that the Other proposes is normality. This normality consists in imposing norms as a remedy for the non rapport, and typically these are male norms (*normes mâles*), as Lacan would say. Normality is the compensation par excellence that satisfies the Other, and when it is also able to satisfy the subject—here is the key reservation—it is a clearly an incurable symptom. On the other hand, at the other extreme, there is perversion. Perversion is a satisfying symptom, in the sense that it is enough—*satis* means “enough” in Latin—of a compensation of *jouissance*. It compensates well enough for the absence of the sexual relation.

This satisfaction does not mean that the pervert will not complain or suffer. Fritz Lang’s marvelous film *M*, is as a prototype in this regard. The compensation function is seen here in all its simplicity: the protagonist, unable to have intercourse with women, strangles little girls. The first people to suffer from his symptom are the others, his victims and their families, but he is also subjected to a very real suffering, because he is divided by the diabolical truth of his *jouissance*, which is his own *jouissance* at the same time as being alien to him. This example shows in an exemplary way how a symptom that satisfies as much as a compensation, despite the pain that the subject might have to pay as its price, is not susceptible to analysis. In other words, Jack the Ripper is not a subject for analysis even if he is really unhappy and really sorry for the consequences of his actions. A warning to those analysts who work in prisons: remember that there are acts which do not involve an appeal to the Other. This, at least, is how I understand Lacan’s advice against taking a subject into analysis who has killed his father, a recommendation that is given without knowing any more information about the case.

Between the symptom of normality that satisfies the Other and the symptom of perversion that goes against the Other, there is, of course, a third form: the neurotic symptom. This neurotic symptom, which Freud qualified as a compromise, is unsatisfying both with respect to norms and to *jouissance*. In this sense, it is abnormal, but it does not succeed in becoming perverse: the neurotic only dreams of being a pervert, for the precise reason that he is not one. Caught between these two dissatisfactions, the subject complains. In this respect, I believe the neurotic symptom par excellence is what Lacan, at one time, called hysteria without symptoms, in the classical and nosographic sense of the term. Hysteria without symptoms is when the subject gives his complaint the dignity of a symptom. This shows us the true source of the symptom, since it involves the subject's yearning for the missing rapport and, at the same time, refusing any substitute for this place that he marks simply with his incessant complaint. This is a position which is, in fact, opposed to the supplementary character of any compensation or substitution of *jouissance*. When it is stubborn, this refusal may go as far as beauty itself or even death, which is not without its link to beauty. We may recall here the example of Socrates.

### THE SYMPTOM OF TRANSFERENCE

What is the impact of the act on the symptom at the start of analysis? The act's first effect is to render the symptom analyzable. This involves a change, and the term "to render" here should be understood in the sense of producing something. The symptom will change its use, that is, it will exchange its value as insufficient *jouissance* for a value as knowledge: this is the induction to the transference. At the start of analysis, one might say that the analytic act has the effect of dissociating the symptom, of producing a separation between its core of *jouissance* and its formal envelope. This is the initial change, which we can make more precise with Lacan's term *dés(a)ification*, in the sense of an extraction of *object a* as surplus *jouissance*. Through this operation, the act serves as a catalyst for speech, allowing what will produce the work of transference to emerge, that is, fragments of unconscious knowledge. This is the situation at the start of analysis.

Transference, however, is a reconstitution of the symptom. The analysand binds himself to the couple analyst-analysand, which went unknown until Freud. It is important in this coupling that the analyst knows what determines him at the level of *jouissance*. As the cause of transference work, he is also the cause of another *jouissance*, that of deciphering. For it is true, as Freud clearly witnessed, that the speaking being never really gives up anything.

The problem is that the symptom in the treatment needs to be transitory, and that if it is the name of the analyst it is a name that is to be lost, like the Name-of-the-Father. In other words, the efficacy of the act is as an operation of the symptom, but at the same time against the symptom. After having constructed the analytic symptom, it must be deconstructed to produce an exit from the process; otherwise, the analysis is interminable.

The exit still has to be a good one. The good one is the one that satisfies. As Lacan put it, “the main aim of analysis is to give this urgently needed satisfaction,” thus positing a final urgency to match the subjective urgency that motivates the entry into the treatment.<sup>5</sup> I would define the exit that is not good as the one which fails to satisfy. Perhaps the form it most often takes is that of the exit due to wear and tear, due to the long passage of time, to weariness; the one which is made on the basis of the “I’ve had enough” of pure resignation. The proper exit, on the other hand, is the one that satisfies. But how should we understand this if not by linking it to the final identification with the symptom?

The incurable subject that I have evoked is a subject identified with its own symptom, at least the symptom I have called fundamental, which defines the symptomatic sexual partner. Is this a return to the *status quo ante*? Certainly it is not, given that it supposes a change, insofar as we come to relate to the transference included in the neurotic symptom.

We must not forget that, if the symptom is a way to enjoy the unconscious, there are different ways to do so. With respect to the marriage between the signifier and jouissance, ciphering is one mode while the fundamental symptom is another. The latter is a function of exception—a logical function—in relation to the infinite labor of ciphering. This symptom anchors or fixes a configuration of constant jouissance, whereas ciphering, which is sporadic, never ceases to displace this jouissance in the series of signs, thus opening up the way to surprise and even innovation. The identification with the fundamental symptom puts a stop to the symptom of transference, and we can say that it exposes the true name of the subject, the name of its own identity of jouissance—an incurable identity.

To illustrate this distance between the symptom as a sign to the analyst in the transference and the symptom as a name, I will return to *M*. The film allows me to situate a difference between neurosis and perversion. It is astonishing how clearly Lang’s film shows us the difference between the symptom as sign and the symptom as name. What makes a sign for *M*. is the little melody that accompanies his outings and signals the murders, but which only the blind, those who are not captured by the jouissance of vision, can hear. This is the sign of the symptom. Then there is the letter *M* that is marked on *M*.’s back: this is the name of the accused, a name with which he does not identify himself, but which the other uses to identify him, since *M*. is obviously neither an analysand nor a neurotic. I will return, then, to the incurable at the end of analysis.

Lacan has left us many formulas for a finite or terminable analysis: the end marked by assuming “being for death,” by subjectivizing castration, by the subjective destitution of the pass, and finally by identifying with the symptom. Amidst this variety, which follows from his structural elaborations, we are left with a question: what is the “saying,” the unique saying, which is to be inferred from the multiple things that have been said (*dits*)?

If we juxtapose Freud's position on a finite analysis, it seems that according to what can be disengaged from what he said (*ses dits*), the actual end is a matter of simple pragmatism. This is not the case with Lacan, who at each stage situates the end in terms of structures, and even of the *matheme*. At the end, we have the identification with the symptom. Is this a theoretical upset, as some have said? It is certain that Lacan's work between 1970 and 1975 is marked by changes: the new Borromean schematism and its clinical advances, the redefinition of the symptom, the devaluation of the hegemony of the symbolic, the reevaluation of the real. Yet, to what extent do these shifts of perspective alter what is to be obtained from the end of an analysis?

I shall argue that the formula is new but the saying is not, for it never varied.

This identification with the symptom is not to be confused with what I will call the identifications of alienation—identifications via the Other—which go from the ideals of the Other, I(A), to the phallic signifier. These identifications certainly try to “crystallize” into an identity, but they are merely elaborate facades that hide a subject that is only supposed, who cannot be identified in the Other, and thus functions only as a lack (-1). The symptom as singular, as Lacan had once said about the Thing, is not on the side of the Other but rather comes from the real, from jouissance. This identification consists, he says, in “recognizing oneself in it.” What does this mean? This expression should be weighed against another, from the same period, that says that one can never recognize oneself in one's unconscious.

Obviously, in order to recognize oneself in one's symptom, one must have identified the symptom at a distance; one must have recognized—beyond the therapeutic changes occurring throughout the analytic elaboration—the specific modalities of jouissance that do not cease to be written for the subject and which define his partner. This is the condition for dealing with the symptom, or as Lacan put it, “knowing how to do it” (*savoir faire avec*). For the neurotic—who, by definition, does not recognize himself in his symptom and continues to deny and complain about it, even when he gives himself the air of a cynic—this is progress.

To recognize oneself in one's symptom is to take upon oneself what must be called a *jouissance-identity*. This has nothing to do with identifying with the Other. Thus the symptom that does not cease to write itself responds to the “What am I?” of the entry into analysis. The end by means of identifying with the symptom is an end through identity, not by identification; or, more precisely, it is an end achieved by what I will call a separation-identity. There is, indeed, no other identity.

The explicit precursor of this thesis can be found at the end of *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, where Lacan, in mentioning an identification of a special type with the *object a*, was already aiming at a separation-identity by jouissance. More essential still, this Borromean symptom determines not only the subject that is supposed in relation to the signifier, but on the contrary, the “real subject” that Lacan designated in 1975 as the one who is irrefutably there: the individual speaking being that has a body and is substantial.

This saying about the end of analysis by separation-identity can be generalized. Regarding the end and the result of the analytic metamorphosis, there is no other saying of Lacan's than this, as I have more extensively demonstrated elsewhere. This saying has moved from the ineffable identity that is affirmed by the ecstatic "you are that" in the 1949 text on the Mirror Stage, through the subjective destitution, to the famous identification with the jouissance-letter of the symptom in 1975. This letter, however, uproots the end from the ineffable, since within language it alone is identical to itself.

Identity is the contrary of mental perplexity and turmoil; separation is the contrary of alienation. It is astounding to witness the extent to which Lacan produced misunderstandings and was grossly misinterpreted by his first students. In a manner that was increasingly pathetic, and thus idealized, these followers put forth, in succession, notions of lack, castration, de-being, destitution, and—of course—non-knowledge. Hence they were stupefied by the appearance of the identification with the symptom, which served only as the final quilting point of the thesis that had been present from the beginning. Lacan himself diagnosed this misunderstanding by evoking those analysts who authorize themselves only by their perplexity.

Without this fundamental thesis of the end by separation-identity, how can we acknowledge an important clinical fact (which, moreover, the enemies of psychoanalysis enjoy pointing out), that those who are called "analyzed," and for whom analysis has sometimes changed everything, have nonetheless, at a certain level, remained the same and even become more incorrigible?

## ETHICS IS NEVER INDIVIDUALISTIC

That the time for understanding has taken so long has its drawbacks. These disadvantages are clinical, of course, but are not confined to the clinic insofar as the conception of the end of analysis has a decisive political import.

From the beginning, Lacan posited that for psychoanalysis "its ethics are never individualistic."<sup>7</sup> On the contrary, it has effects on our current civilization. Rereading his early texts, I have been struck by the number of virulent remarks Lacan makes about the era, which can still be perfectly applied to the beginning of the twenty-first century. I shall quickly cite a few. From "Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis": it is a time of "social hell" in which "touching" victims are produced by the "barbarity of the Darwinian century"<sup>8</sup>; from "Function and Field of Speech and Language": the subject "loses his meaning in the objectifications of discourse" within "our scientific civilization"<sup>9</sup>; from the "Remarks on Daniel Lagache's Presentation": the widespread ethics of the superego and of dread<sup>10</sup>; from "La troisième": we are all proletarians, insofar as we no longer have anything from which we can make a social bond.<sup>11</sup>

Corresponding to each of these diagnoses, the mission of psychoanalysis is redefined: with the touching victim, “we clear anew the path to his meaning in a discrete fraternity”<sup>12</sup>; despite his or her lost meaning “the subject’s satisfaction is achievable in the satisfaction of all”<sup>13</sup>; getting out of the ethic of the superego is achieved by the silence of desire. In “Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire,” it is making one’s castration serve as the regulation of desire; in *Television* it is getting out of the capitalist discourse; and finally, in “La troisième,” there is a countering of the real, that is, the real of the proletarian social symptom.

It would be necessary to follow this progression in greater detail, but we can already observe, in every case, that the objective that Lacan prescribes goes in the direction of restoring to subjects a place in the social bond that passes through disalienation.

On this point, what can be said of the identification with the symptom? Does it not add to the modern proletarian’s forced individualism and dereliction? Some colleagues have asked, with today’s subjects prey to the values of capitalism, how can we still recommend that each “meet at its horizon the subjectivity of his time,” as Lacan recommended for the analyst at the end of “The Function and Field of Speech and Language.”<sup>14</sup> Perhaps these colleagues have imagined that the identification with the symptom was homogeneous to what I have called the regime of “general narcissism” that capitalism produces.

This, I think, is the error. The social symptom of all proletarians, which globalizes and standardizes each subject’s relation with the products of the market, effectively disrupts the social bond. In its wake, this symptom establishes merely a single—and not very social—bond for each subject to a prescribed surplus jouissance. This is not necessarily the case for the Borromean symptom at the end of analysis, which knots desire and jouissance for each subject in a singular—never global—way, without at the same time excluding the social bond. Quite to the contrary, the Borromean symptom alone can ensure what Lacan called a more-worthy love, and even “the exit from the herd.”

Confronted with the globalization of merchandized jouissance, and thus with standardized surplus jouissance, identification with the symptom highlights a singularity of jouissance without any nostalgic resort to values from the past that have become powerless. It is thus linked to the subjectivity of the age, or at least to what remains of it in a discourse that tries to master desires. Lacan is up to date now more than ever.

Does it not remain the case, however, that the solution to neurosis by identifying with the symptom still is not a way out of an individualistic ethic? This is why, I think, Lacan could say this approach fell short. But it is also the reason why he added the necessity of making a number, and also that of a complement, for analysts; that is, the solution by means of the school.

1. This text resumes a number of developments begun in 1987, in a text devoted to the aim of the analytic act, and continued until 1994 at the meetings of *L'international des forums-l'Ecole de psychanalyse du Champ Lacanien*.
2. Colette Soler, "Le second retour à Freud," *Boletín del círculo psicanalítico de Vigo* (1986).
3. Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: Encore: On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge, 1972-1973*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: Norton, 1998), 131.
4. Lacan, *RSI* (1974-1975), unpublished seminar, 18 February 1975.
5. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1981), ix.
6. Colette Soler, "Les invariants de l'analyse finie," *Hétéroté* 5 (June 2005).
7. Lacan, "The Freudian Thing," in *Écrits*, trans. Bruce Fink in collaboration with Héloïse Fink and Russell Grigg (New York: Norton, 2006), 346.
8. Lacan, "Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis," *Écrits*, 101, 99.
9. Lacan, "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis," *Écrits*, 232-233.
10. Lacan, "Remarks on Daniel Lagache's Presentation," *Écrits*, 543-574.
11. Lacan, "La troisième," *Lettres de l'Ecole freudienne* 16 (1975): 177-203.
12. Lacan, "Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis," 101.
13. Lacan, "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis," 264.
14. Ibid.

